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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Computer networks are under attack today more than ever before. Whether the attacker 
is a script-kiddie trying to break into a public web server for fun and bragging rights, or a 
focused, experienced adversary with intimate knowledge of the targeted organization and a 
specific goal, security adminstrators have a great challenge in protecting their resources. In 
the search for tools to aid the security administrator, intrusion detection systems have become 
popular as a supplement to other basic security devices such as firewalls. Monitoring user 
behavior or sniffing the packets that enter and leave the organization's network, they look 
for telltale signs of malicious activity, alerting the administrator whenever a possible break-in 
attempt is detected. 
Intrusion detection systems are not perfect, however. One major criticism is that they often 
produce false positives, i.e., alerts that correspond to legitimate user or network activity. Stefan 
Axelsson [Axe99] provides an analysis of network intrusion detection systems that shows, under 
reasonable assumptions about the activity on a network and the capabilities of the IDS, if the 
number of false positives is significant, the security administrator's task of sorting through the 
alerts for serious threats will be nearly impossible. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There has yet to be discovered an optimal solution to the problem of dealing with the 
typically large number of false positives produced by intrusion detection systems. This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that some IDS implementations can be exploited to produce yet more 
false positives. Samuel Patton et al. [PYDOl] show how an attacker might take advantage of 
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the ease with which false positives can be generated. By introducing artificial packets into the 
network he or she can generate false positives in order to mask their actual attack or desensitize 
the system monitors to an attack they will use in the future. 
Skilled security administrators may be able to tune the IDS products for their particular 
networks in such a way as to reduce the number of false positives, but not all administrators 
may have the time or knowledge to do so effectively. With constantly evolving tools and 
approaches in the hands of foes, the administrator would also be required to tweak the IDS 
often, so as to avoid missing the newest types of attacks. A better solution is needed, so 
that security administrators can spend less time setting up their IDS products and more time 
looking for and reacting to threats to their resources. 
1.3 Thesis Statement 
In this thesis we take a visual approach to dealing with the amount of information intrusion 
detection systems provide. We want to aid the security administrator in detecting as many 
actual attacks as possible, while also helping him or her recognize the false alarms that would 
otherwise waste their time. The emphasis of our work is exploring the area of three dimensional 
visualization, an approach that has not received much attention thus far in IDS-related visu-
alization. Additionally, we use aggregated statistics about network activity as an additional 
source of data for visualization, providing the administrator with multiple perspectives on the 
state of their resources. 
1.4 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we discuss the basic concepts of intrusion 
detection systems, followed by a review of the literature related to dealing with IDS alerts 
and visualization for intrusion detection purposes. We describe our approach in chapter 3, 
including details of the aggregated network statistics and the actual visualizations themselves. 
Chapter 4 presents the experimental results we obtained during evaluation of our implemented 
visualizations, and chapter 5 concludes with a summary and ideas for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS 
2 .1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
A multitude of intrusion detection system implementations exist, but they can generally 
be classified into a small number of types. Two characteristics by which an IDS can be 
classified are how it analyzes data to detect malicious activity and what type of data it analyzes. 
Herve Debar et al. [DDW99] classify intrusion detection systems using the former criterion as 
either knowledge-based or behavior-based, and using the latter criterion as either host-based 
or network-based. Their classifications are summarized below. 
2.1.1 Knowledge-based IDS 
Some intrusion detection systems of this type are also known as signature-based or misuse-
based. These systems rely on previous knowledge of known attacks to detect attempts to 
compromise a resource. Generally they use a database of rules, where each rule specifies some 
key component of an attack. Each event that the IDS analyzes is checked against all rules, 
and if a match is found an alert is generated. 
Knowledge-based intrusion detection systems are useful in that they can provide a lot of 
information about each detected attack, since the rules are usually very specific. They also, 
in theory, should have a low false-alarm rate for the same reason. The major disadvantage 
of knowledge-based IDS is that the rule base must be updated often to catch new types of 
attacks. Even with updated rules, such systems will still miss novel attacks for which no rules 
have been written. 
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2.1.2 Behavior-based IDS 
Behavior-based intrusion detection systems are sometimes also known as anomaly-based 
systems. They try to detect malicious activity by comparing each event to a baseline repre-
sentation of expected behavior. If the event differs too much from the expected behavior an 
alert is generated. A profile of the system resources to be monitored must thus be generated 
before detection of intrusions can begin. 
The major advantage of behavior-based intrusion detection systems is that they can poten-
tially detect novel attacks. They may also identify malicious activities of a valid system user 
if he or she takes some actions that are noticeably different from their normal activities. The 
drawbacks of behavior-based systems include their propensity for false alarms and the need to 
develop updated profiles of expected behavior as that behavior changes over time. It is also 
difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee that no malicious activity is taking place while the 
profile is being updated. 
2.1.3 Host-based IDS 
Host-based intrusion detection systems use various sources of audit data generated locally 
on a single host. The audit data may include user and process listings, memory and processor 
usage, system calls, and other audit services provided by the operating system. The data is 
analyzed for malicious activity using either a behavior or knowledge-based approach. 
Host-based systems have an advantage over network-based systems in that they are able 
to analyze what is happening at a user-level. They can potentially analyze data that was 
encrypted on the network, whereas a network-based system would only be able to analyze the 
network headers. One disadvantage of host-based systems is the fact that, since they run on the 
same host they are analyzing, an attacker that has gained privileges may be able to interfere 
with the intrusion detection system's ability to generate alerts. Additionally, each instance of 
a host-based system runs on a single host, and more effort is required if alerts generated on 
each host are to be correlated in some way. 
5 
2.1.4 Network-based IDS 
Network-based intrusion detection systems, or NIDS, use information gleaned from raw 
network packets as their source of data. One or more dedicated NIDS devices are installed at 
strategic locations on the network so as to sniff and analyze communication between as many 
hosts as possible. In each packet headers may be analyzed at many different levels, including 
the network layer (Internet Protocol), the transport layer (Transmission Control Protocol, 
User Datagram Protocol), and the application layer (Simple Network Management Protocol, 
HyperText Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, etc.). Payload may also be analyzed as 
long as it is not encrypted. Again, either behavior-based or knowledge-based analysis may be 
employed. 
Network-based systems are useful for detecting malicious activities directed at the network 
itself, such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. They have an additional advantage over host-
based systems in that they usually do not consume any of the resources on a host tasked for 
other purposes, since network-based systems typically run on dedicated hosts. Disadvantages 
of NIDS devices include the fact that they are unable to analyze any encrypted data in a 
packet, and any alerts they generate will likely contain no information identifying which user 
on a particular system may have been the source of the malicious activity. Additionally, large, 
high-bandwidth networks may produce more packets than a single network-based system can 
effectively process. 
2.2 Previous work 
Some research has been done in finding ways to work with the large number of alerts 
produced by various intrusion detection systems, both visually and non-visually. There has 
also been a substantial effort recently to directly visualize network information as a sort of 
intrusion detection system that uses human visual cognition abilities to detect interesting 
events, rather than relying on knowledge or behavior-based algorithms. We cover areas of 
previous work by first examining approaches that deal with IDS alerts, followed by a survey 
of network data visualization systems. 
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2.2.1 Dealing with IDS alerts 
Frederic Cuppens [CupOl] describes work done in the MIRADOR project to combine alerts 
from a variety of intrusion detection systems. Alerts are analyzed and clustered into groups 
that correspond to distinct attacks, and then global alerts are generated from these clusters. 
The global alerts are correlated to develop a picture of what the attacker may do next. Since 
typical IDS only generate alerts for elementary attacks, and a serious attacker will probably 
use a number of attacks as part of an overall plan, Cuppens' efforts are designed to reveal this 
higher-level plan. Some experimental results obtained using a combination of two NIDS, the 
open source package Snort [Roe99] and the commercial product eTrust [Com05], demonstrate 
the feasibility of generating global alerts from clusters. 
In a similar effort, Herve Debar and Andreas Wespi [DWOl] describe the concept of an 
aggregation and correlation component (ACC). An ACC takes alerts produced by any number 
of external IDS connected to it and analyzes them in order to extract the important security 
problems an administrator needs to deal with. The work is designed to address the issues of 
alert flooding, identifying related alerts, false alarms, and scaling for large IDS deployments. 
In particular, the ACC addresses false alarms primarily by considering the accuracy of each 
alert. Accuracy is determined by associating a default confidence value with each alert based 
on its predetermined inaccuracy (which should be modified by the system administrator to 
reflect peculiarities of the local operating environment). Presumably the confidence value is 
then used by the ACC as it receives alerts to determine whether there is a serious issue at 
hand. 
In a two-dimensional visual approach, Hideki Koike and Kazuhiro Ohno [K004] develop a 
visualization tool called Snort View with the goal of helping the security administrator avoid 
the need to finely tune a network IDS (Snort in this case). On a grid with time as the 
horizontal axis and source IP address as the vertical, they display information including each 
NIDS alert, the priority of each alert, and the type of attack, encoded as position, color, and 
shape, respectively. Additionally, events from a system log are incorporated into the display to 
provide additional context. These are also drawn as symbols, and clicking any symbol brings 
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up the text describing the associated alert or event. 
Since an alert of one type, associated with one source IP address, may appear multiple times 
consecutively in the NIDS log, Koike and Ohno take a step to reduce visual clutter by only 
displaying the first instance of such a sequence of alerts and drawing a vertical line over that 
instance to indicate how many identical alerts follow. For additional statistical information, 
they similarly draw a horizontal bar at the vertical axis for each source IP address to indicate 
how many times an address has appeared in the logs. These two steps are interesting in that 
they demonstrate effective ways to overlay additional information on a 2D grid without adding 
much, if any, difficulty in decoding the primary information on display. 
Finally, a second grid is placed directly to the right of the first in order to display the 
destination IP addresses associated with the alerts. The horizontal axis on the secondary grid 
lists destination addresses, and the vertical axis is implicitly the same as the first. When an 
alert in the first grid is clicked with the mouse, a line is drawn from that symbol back to the 
vertical axis of the first grid, and a second line is drawn to the right, into the secondary grid. 
Once it reaches the column of the associated destination IP address, it makes a 90 degree turn 
down. These lines allow the user to quickly see which two IP addresses were involved in any 
particular alert. 
2.2.2 Visualizing network data 
Robert Erbacher [ErbOl] discusses a method to visualize various network and system activi-
ties in an effort to provide enough context for a security administrator to distinguish legitimate 
threats from normal activity and false alarms. In the two-dimensional display, the host be-
ing monitored is represented at the center as an outlined circle. The thickness of the circle 
represents system load, while the number of short lines protruding outward from the circle 
represent the number of users on the system. Starting a little farther out from the circle, lines 
extend outward towards smaller circles, representing connections from other hosts. The lines 
are varied by color and drawing style (solid, dashed, with arrows, etc.) to differentiate between 
types of connections like NFS, telnet, and ftp. Attacks identified by the Portsentry tool are 
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also displayed as thick, bright red lines. Intensity is used to show the time since a node last 
accessed the monitored host. The distance from the center to an outer circle is determined by 
how many octets of the IP addresses match. If only the last octet differs, the corresponding 
smaller circle is drawn on a ring close to the center. If the last two octets differ, then it is 
drawn on a second ring farther out, and so on. The exact positioning of a node on a ring is 
remembered so that connections from the same host can be identified over time. Finally, the 
border of the screen is colored according to the time of day. 
Erbacher argues that such a visual display provides enough information to help a security 
administrator make a better judgement about whether a particular event is suspicous and 
should be further investigated. He provides one example of a user who is trying to connect to 
a monitored host via telnet in the middle of the night. The line associated with the user's node 
is colored red because a reverse-lookup reveals that the node's IP address has no hostname 
associated with it. Given the time of day, and the fact that the majority of the other (non-
highlighted) connections on the display are likely leftover from legitimate users who logged-in 
earlier, this particular connection stands out. 
Rather than working with alerts produced by another IDS, Greg Vert et al. [VFM98] 
describe a three-dimensional geometric approach to representing system information which 
could be used as a basis for intrusion detection. A spheroid geometric primitive called a spicule 
represents the various bits of information related to a single host on a network. The volume 
of a spicule corresponds to a computed value, based on various factors, that represents the 
associated host's security fitness. Individual features are displayed using visual components 
called tracking vectors and fixed vectors. For features which have minimum and maximum 
values, tracking vectors travel from the horizontal plane towards the positive vertical axis on 
the surface of the spicule as the value of the feature approaches its maximum. Features that 
have no bound on growth are represented by fixed vectors around the equator of the spicule 
which grow outwards as their values increase. 
It is proposed that this model could be used for intrusion detection by considering how a 
spicule changes as a system's state changes. If a system is known to be in a certain state, such 
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as normal or under attack, the vectors around the spicule for that system may be used as a 
geometric signature of such a state, represented as angles for tracking vectors and magnitudes 
for fixed vectors. The geometric signature for a specific attack, for example, could be added 
to the spicule for a system under normal operation, resulting in a visual of what that system 
will look like under attack. 
Other ideas considered include collapsing the spicule down to a singularity and plotting it 
with other such singularities in a three-dimensional space, with the x- and z-axes representing 
the last two octets of the IP address, and the y-axis representing a value derived from the 
vectors of the spicule. This would allow for the visualization of relationships between hosts 
and potentially the detection of intrusions from remote hosts. While implementations are not 
discussed in the paper, linking the two models of visualization through some kind of interactive 
drill-down would be an interesting way to quickly access the detailed information in a spicule 
from the higher-level view of host-to-host relationships. 
Jonathan McPherson et al. developed an interesting visualization focused on TCP and UDP 
port traffic called PortVis [MMK+04]. One challenge faced by network security researchers is 
the lack of available data sets on which to test ideas. Most organizations are understandably 
reluctant to release real captured traffic from their actual networks due to privacy concerns. 
The Port Vis tool has an advantage over other efforts in regard to this dilemma because it 
uses very general information aggregated from network traffic flows. Specifically, the following 
pieces of data, accumulated over each hour, are used: 
• Protocol (TCP or UDP) 
• Port 
•Hour 
• Session count 
• Unique source addresses 
• Unique destination addresses 
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• Unique source/destinationa address pairs 
• Unique source countries 
Given the high-level nature of the data being analyzed, an organization that wouldn't 
normally allow details of their network traffic to be made public might be less inhibited in 
allowing the use of aggregated statistics. As it turns out, the PortVis developers were able to 
use network data from United States Department of Energy sites. 
The goals for the tool were discovering large-scale attacks and identifying smaller-scale 
attacks that might be analyzed by people with privileged access to the detailed network traffic. 
The main visualization consists of a two-dimensional 256 x 256 grid on which each position 
corresponds to a port; the vertical axis corresponds to the port number mod 256, and the 
horizontal axis corresponds to the integer value of the port number divided by 256. The color 
of the dot is determined by the value of a piece of data, which can be selected from the list 
above, at a given hour. While this part of the visualization takes up the majority of the display 
space, a number of smaller visuals are included as well. A timeline on the right-hand side gives 
a higher-level view of the port data. Within the timeline a window may be moved to select 
the current hour displayed in the main visualization. Back in the main visualization a marker 
may be moved around to select a small number of ports, which are magnified in a small space 
at the bottom-left corner of the display. Here the exact port numbers and data values for 
the selected ports are shown. Further drill-down may be accomplished by choosing one of the 
magnified ports, which then causes a three-dimensional timeline of all five data categories to 
be displayed in a window to the right of the magnification window. This timeline conveys the 
values of each data attribute, and the user is allowed to rotate the port timeline display about 
the vertical axis to get different perspectives. Finally, a fifth area of the display, called the 
gradient editor, is used to control the mapping from data values to colors in the main display. 
This allows the user to highlight different attribute values in the main display. 
Using the sample data, McPherson et al. demonstrate the discovery of port scan traffic. 
They also show anomalous activity occurring during a single hour on three sequential ports 
near the high end of the port range, which they suggest would warrant further investigation. 
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Given how general the data used in Port Vis is, it is impressive that some security events can 
be detected. It would be interesting to run this visualization on network traffic data sets with 
known attacks to see how many different types of attacks present some visible indication of 
their presence. 
Robert Ball et al. created a visualization tool called VISUAL (Visual Information Secu-
rity Utility for Administration Live), which is designed to be part of a larger project called 
Network Eye [BFN04]. Their aim is to provide an overview of the network traffic on small to 
medium-sized networks based on packet-level data sources. The "Home-Centric" portion of 
the visualization comes in the form of a two-dimensional grid of squares, where each square 
may represent a host on the home, or internal, network. There are a couple of visualization 
displays to alternate between, one for internal-external traffic and one for internal-only traf-
fic. In internal-external mode, the external hosts are represented by individual squares placed 
around the internal grid. To be more precise, the external squares are actually placed first, 
and then the internal grid is placed in the largest empty space available. External squares are 
placed in a manner such that the square for a given host always appears in nearly the same 
location-the initial location is determined on the horizontal axis by the first two octets of the 
IP address and on the vertical axis by the last two octets. As the squares are drawn with 
three different sizes to represent three levels of network traffic, however, special care is taken 
to avoid overlap. If drawing the square at the original position would occlude part of another 
square, the new square is moved around nearby until enough empty space is found. 
The existence of communication between an internal and external host is represented by a 
line drawn between the internal host's grid square and the external host's square. Lines are 
color-coded to indicate the direction of communication: red for external-to-internal, blue for 
bidirectional, and green for internal-to-external. The ports used in communication between two 
hosts are indicated by horizontal lines drawn within the external host's square. The distance 
from the top of the square indicates where the port falls in the range of possible port numbers. 
The existence of communication between internal hosts is represented more generally by 
simply coloring an internal host's grid square a shade of green that corresponds to how much 
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it communicated with other home-network hosts. More detailed information on internal host 
communication can be seen by switching the visualization to internal-internal mode, in which 
each internal host is represented twice, once on the grid, and once as what would have been 
an external-host square in the internal-external mode. 
The user is able to filter the data displayed in a number of ways. Individual hosts or groups 
can be selected to display only the communication data associated with them. Addresses of 
hosts to display can be selected using Classless Internet Domain Routing (CIDR) notation. 
Data associated with specific protocols such as TCP, UDP, or ICMP can be isolated on the 
display. A timeline can also be used to display the communication data for any one-second 
window of time, instead of displaying the accumulated data for the entire analysis period. 
This window can be moved rapidly, causing hosts to appear and disappear. Since some hosts 
may only appear for a very short time, a shadow feature is provided which places a light-gray 
square in an external host's location if that host appears in the data anywhere in a user-
definable window of time (the default is 200 seconds) before the current one-second window. 
This helps the user avoid overlooking hosts that have bursty communication patterns, or that 
simply appear very few times overall. 
Finally, the visualization allows the user to retrieve the following specific information about 
a host by selecting it in the display: 
• IP address 
• IP addresses of all hosts communicated with 
• TCP /UDP ports used 
• Percentage of total traffic contributed during the analysis period 
Ball et al. show that the visualization system they designed is fairly intuitive by conducting 
a study with untrained users. After describing how the VISUAL tool works and giving them 
a brief chance to become acquainted with it, each subject was asked to complete a number of 
analysis tasks using some test data sets. Examples of the tasks include describing anything 
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striking, identifying four external hosts that seem to be involved in normal communication 
with internal hosts, and identifying the four internal hosts that made the most connections to 
external hosts. All of the users in the study were able to find the same abnormalities in the 
data sets, even though some of them did not know what some of the abnormalities represented, 
such as a ping sweep in one case. 
Although discussed only briefly in the context of a larger project, Christos Papadopoulos 
et al. mention the use of three-dimensional graphics in their work on an audio-visual system 
for network security and management [PKS+04]. They start by discussing the use of spectral 
analysis techniques on network traffic. Two-dimensional graphs are shown that viusalize differ-
ences between single and multi-source Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, congested 
and uncongested network links, and other protocol behaviors. The authors then move on to 
the interesting idea of using auditory cues to represent network data. They propose extending 
this idea to a multi-channel audio system which would allow more precise placement of distinct 
sounds in three-dimensional space. 
Finally, they bring in the topic of three-dimensional visualization, and more specifically, 
3D auto-stereoscopic displays. Unlike previous stereoscopic technology that required the user 
to wear head-tracking goggles, these systems do not require any extra hardware other than 
the display itself. Padadopolos et al. show a few examples of how they would make use of 
such a display. The general idea is to represent a small network topology in a single plane 
oriented obliquely towards the user. Two-dimensional graphs of data, possibly consisting of 
raw network statistics or spectral analysis results, may then be drawn adjacently on the left 
or right of selected nodes in the topology to represent data specific to each of those nodes. 
The graphs are oriented such that they directly face the viewer. It is an interesting approach 
that combines familiar two-dimensional displays of network topology and data plots in a novel 
three-dimensional layout. 
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CHAPTER 3. VISUALIZATION APPROACH 
Having considered previous work in visualization techniques for the purpose of intrusion 
detection, we move now to a discussion of the approaches we considered. We focused on 
developing a variety of three-dimensional visualizations, each one emphasizing different aspects 
of the data. We first discuss the types of data used as input and some techniques for data 
reduction, followed by descriptions of each of the visualization concepts. Results are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
3.1 Dealing with data 
For any visualization, one must consider the data that will be visualized. Will the raw data 
itself be useful as is, or will it overwhelm the processing capabilities of either man or machine? 
While the specific details of any piece of data are generally useful, too many details displayed 
at once can potentially overwhelm the user. Thus we made an effort to provide a higher-level 
view of the data in our visualizations, leaving the task of more sophisticated drill-down for 
future work. 
3.1.1 Data sources 
We used two primary sources of data as input for our visualizations, though not all of the 
visualizations make use of both types of data. IDS alerts are the first source, representing 
any suspcious signs of malicious activity as detected by the intruson detection system. In 
this case we chose to use the open-source network IDS Snort, due to its popularity in the 
security community and free availability. The components of an alert that we focused on 
in the visualizations were the timestamp, priority, source and destination IP addresses, and 
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the destination port if the alert was associated with TCP or UDP traffic. We used the alert 
message text to provide additional information for the user in one of our visualizations. 
Secondly, we incorporated information on raw network activity as another piece of data 
for visualization. As one of the common criticisms of intrusion detection systems is difficulty 
in dealing with false alarms, we wanted to add some background information that might help 
the user of the visualization make a more informed decision on whether a particular alert is in 
fact serious. We also discovered that some attacks were evident from visualizing the network 
activity alone. In particular, we decided to focus on TCP and UDP traffic since these transport 
layer protocols provide the basis for most all application-level protocols. 
3.1.2 Data reduction 
Given the volume of network traffic on even a medium-sized network, we needed to use 
some data reduction techniques to make the network traffic data more manageable. The first 
technique we used was aggregation of statistics about the network traffic over small time 
periods. As our aim was to provide a fairly high-level picture of activity, we chose a time 
period of five minutes. The basic unit of information we consider is a tuple of three elements: 
(source IP address, destination IP address, destination port) 
Jianqiang Xin [Xin03] calls this tuple an SDP and uses it as a correlation feature in his own 
work on visualization for network intrusion detection. In each five minute period, we aggregate 
the following information for each SDP: 
• Size of payload in bytes 
• Number of packets seen 
We utilized a second data-reduction technique to eliminate superfluous SDPs. Consider that 
when an application on host A sends the first TCP or UDP packet to a listening application 
on host B, host A must allocate a port from which the packet will be sent. While the operating 
system has some internal algorithm for allocating these ports, the actual port number chosen 
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does not generally give any useful information to the external observer. If host B then sends a 
reponse, it uses the allocated source port on host A as the destination port in each packet. Since 
our aggregation tool simply looks at the destination port in each packet, it would normally 
aggregate information about each of these allocated ports separately. 
Our view is that aggregating data separately for the dynamically allocated ports does not 
provide enough useful information to the user of our system to warrant the tracking of such 
statistics. Thus, we instead give the user the option of adding the size of payload and number 
of packets seen for traffic destined for these ports in with the aggregated data for the associated 
privileged port. This option helps the user avoid being overwhelmed with useless information 
in the visualizations. 
To build on the earlier example, suppose that host A is running a web server on the well-
known privileged port 80 using TCP. A user on host B opens her web browser and visits many 
different pages that are served by host A. As she loads each new page, her web browser will 
make a series of connections to host A in order to download the hypertext of the page as well 
as the resources it references. Each of these connections will be allocated a different source 
TCP port from which to send the request, and downloading the required bits for a single page 
may use five, ten, or more separate connections. The activity is demonstrated in figure 3.1. 
Without the reduction option described above, the network activity in the diagram would 
result in aggregation of data for four different SDPs: 
SDP 1: 
SDP 2: 
SDP 3: 
SDP 4: 
(192.168.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 80) 
(10.0.0.1, 192.168.0.1, 5000) 
(10.0.0.1, 192.168.0.1, 5001) 
(10.0.0.1, 192.168.0.1, 5002) 
By using the data reduction option we would only get the first SDP for the network activity 
in the figure, and the data on payload size and number of packets for all network activity would 
be aggregated with the first SDP. 
The only potentially useful information we lose by doing this reduction concerns the number 
of connections made from one host to another. With the four SDPs listed above, we can see 
Host B: Client 
192.168.0.1 
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DST PORT: 80, SRC PORT: 5000 
GET INDEX.HTML 
DST PORT: 5000, SRC PORT: 80 
INDEX.HTML 
DST PORT: 80, SRC PORT: 5001 
GET IMAGE01.PNG 
DST PORT: 5001, SRC PORT: 80 
IMAGE01.PNG 
DST PORT: 80, SRC PORT: 5002 
GET IMAGE02.PNG 
DST PORT: 5002, SRC PORT: 80 
IMAGE02.PNG 
Host A: Web Server 
10.0.0.1 
Figure 3.1 Example of source port allocation 
that three separate connections were made from host B to host A. With regard to intrusion 
detection, this could be useful as an indicator of a malicious activity like password-guessing (an 
attacker makes multiple telnet or ssh connections, guessing a different password each time). 
A solution to address this, which we have not yet implemented, would be to incorporate a 
count of the number of source ports associated with each SDP. Adding this feature into the 
visualizations may provide an extra piece of useful information. 
3.2 Visual concepts 
We came up with three visual concepts, each one creating a different picture for the user. 
Each visualization does not necessarily use all pieces of information from the packet aggregation 
process or the IDS alerts, but each piece of information is used by at least one concept. A brief 
description of each idea follows, along with sample screenshots. 
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3.2.1 Island 
The Island concept (figure 3.2) takes an iconic approach to visualization. We use only 
the aggregated packet information here, focusing on a port-centric view. As the SDP data 
is processed by this visualization each record is sorted into a data structure, first by the 
time period it falls into and secondly by destination port. We use a five minute time period 
granularity, which is the same as the data reduction tool. For each of these (time period, port) 
records, we maintain lists of associated source IP addresses and destination IP addresses, as 
well as the number of bytes of payload transferred. 
The island idea works as follows: positions on the surface of the island represent the full port 
range, 1 to 65535, and tree figures are placed on these positions to represent active destination 
ports during a time range. The ports from 1 to 1024, the privileged ports, are given positions 
on three invisible concentric rings at the outer edge of the island. Ports 1 through 359 fall 
on the outermost ring, ports 360 through 719 fall on a slightly smaller ring, and ports 720 
through 1024 fall on a third ring slightly smaller than the second. The lowest port on each of 
these rings is positioned towards the right side of the island, as oriented in the screenshot, i.e., 
at 0 degrees if the island were considered a unit circle. Each port in sequence is placed one 
degree apart from the previous port in counter-closewise fashion. Note that there is a range 
of empty locations on the third ring due to having just over 300 ports assigned to it; about 60 
degrees on the ring is wasted. We did this for simplicity of implementation, but ideally one 
would space the ports on these three rings more proportionally, so as to make the best use of 
the space. 
Ports 1025 through 65535 are positioned on the inside of these three outer rings. Starting 
a little further towards the middle of the island, near the location of port 1024, these ports 
are given positions which spiral inwards toward the middle as their port numbers increase. By 
arranging ports in this circular fashion, we maintain some visual grouping of ports that are 
numerically close to one another, which may prove useful in detecting some types of attacks 
like small-scale sequential port scans. While there are a number of services that have assigned 
port numbers above 1024, they are not as many as those in the privileged range, and the 
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majority of port numbers above 1024 are used for dynamic allocation as source ports. Given 
this, we are not concerned that a user would find it difficult to predict where on the island 
a port with a high number would appear, since most of these port numbers have no intrinsic 
meaning. 
The trees on the island are thus drawn at positions based on destination ports. We make 
use of the additional information accumulated for each port by drawing a number of features 
based on that information. First of all, multiple branches are drawn perpendicular to a tree's 
trunk to represent the associated destination IP addresses. We split the address into its four 
octet components and use the individual octets to affect how the branch is drawn. The first, 
most-significant octet determines at what angle about the trunk's axis the branch will be 
positioned. The second octet determines the height at which the branch is attached to the 
tree. The third octet is used to determine how far out on the branch to draw a smaller twig, 
and the fourth octet determines the angle about the branch's axis to position the twig. Thus 
each of the four components of an IP address affects a different property of the corresponding 
branch. 
Similar to the branch idea, we draw leaves at the top of the tree based on the components 
of the associated source IP addresses. The first and second octets are used to select a color 
in the red and green components of RGB color space. The third octet determines the angle 
about the tree to position the leaf, and the fourth octet affects how far the leaf extends out 
from the tree. Finally we make use of the number of bytes transferred by drawing a purple 
sphere at the top of each tree, which could be thought of as a piece of fruit. The size of the 
fruit is logarithmically related to the number of bytes, and the fruit is not drawn if no bytes 
of payload were transferred. 
The user can move through the time domain in this visualization using keyboard input. As 
the time period changes, the state of trees and their features change to reflect each period's 
aggregated statistics. Some services will cause trees to be visible for almost every time period , 
such as high-traffic web servers and domain name service daemons. Other services may appear 
much less frequently, and in the case of some malicious activity maybe only once. Consider 
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a trojan application that an attacker manages to get installed on a target system. If the 
application is designed to open a backdoor remote login service on a high port at a certain time, 
the attacker may only make use of it once for a short period of time. While our visualization 
should render a tree associated with this activity, if the user is scrolling through the time 
dimension quickly they may miss it as it would only be a blip. To address this we added one 
more feature, which may be toggled while the visualization is running. After rendering the 
trees for the current time period , if this feature is enabled, trees for each of the previous five 
time periods will be rendered simultaneously. Each of the previous time periods is rendered 
with increasing transparency as they go farther back in time, allowing the user to still focus 
on the opaque trees of the current time period while having some sense of the recent history. 
3.2.2 Alert Plot 
For this visualization (figure 3.3) we focus on the IDS alerts instead of the packet aggrega-
tion information. A rectangle with three panels is drawn in the foreground. The horizontal axis 
of the panels represents the time domain, while the vertical axis represents port numbers. We 
provide different levels of view of the time domain by using a different scale in each panel. The 
rightmost panel represents one hour of time, the middle panel represents the previous twenty 
four hours, and the leftmost panel represents the previous week. For each IDS alert that falls 
into the time range currently in view, we draw a small cube at the position corresponding to 
its time of detection and associated destination port (or 0 for ICMP packets). The cubes are 
color-coded by the priority of the associated alert, which ranges from highest priority (1, red) 
to lowest priority (5, blue). User input shifts the current period of time in view. 
We first tried plotting alerts vertically based on port numbers using a linear scale, but this 
proved unsatisfactory as it was very difficult to distinguish beteen port numbers in the lower , 
privileged range (1-1024). We next tried using a logarithmic scale to give more space to the 
privileged ports, but this had the side-effect of compressing the many alerts associated with 
higher port numbers into a very small space; we had essentially the same problem as before. 
Our current solution uses a hybrid scale. The lower half of the vertical axis represents ports 0 
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through 1024, where 0 is used for alerts associated with ICMP traffic. The upper half is split 
into 1024 positions, and the rest of the port range is mapped to these positions by taking the 
port number modulo 1024. This technique provides better spacing between ports while also 
allowing for interesting clusters of alerts to appear , such as those that might be associated 
with a port scan. 
As Koike and Ohno noted [K004], alerts that are identical in all properties except time 
may often occur repeatedly. Our experience corroborated this as well, and in fact, during our 
evaluation phase, there were some portions of the evaluation data set that produced so many 
alerts as to cause a major decrease in the responsiveness of this visualization. We needed to 
draw fewer alerts in these cases, and our solution borrows from that of Koike and Ohno. We 
render the first alert in such a series as a cube, and then draw a horizontal line to the position 
that the last alert in the series would have occupied had it been rendered. This grouping of 
alerts is done as the visualization processes the incoming alert data. It remembers the most 
recent time it saw each alert , and as each new alert is processed we check if one of the same 
type, with the same destination port and associated IP addresses, has been seen before. If 
it has been seen, and the new alert occurred within a predefined window of time after the 
previous one, we group the new alert with the old one instead of creating a new record. The 
grouping is done simply by maintaining two timestamps for each alert: the timestamp of the 
first alert in the group, and the timestamp of the last alert in the group. If the two timestamps 
match, then the "group" actually represents a single alert. 
In addition to the foreground panels, we also draw two more panels farther in the back-
ground, above the alert panels, and slightly angled. The left of these two panels represents 
internal IP addresses associated with alerts , where the vertical axis represents the third octet 
and the horizontal axis represents the fourth octet. The panel on the right represents external 
IP addresses associated with alerts, where the vertical axis represents the first octet and the 
horizontal axis represents the second octet. Thus, each panel is a 256 by 256 grid of points. 
The grid of the left panel provides positions for each host of a class B network, and the grid 
of the right panel provides positions for each class B network. When an alert is drawn in the 
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rightmost panel of the rectangle in the foreground (i.e., when it is in the hour-long panel) , 
lines are drawn up to either or both of the IP address panels to indicate which addresses are 
associated with that alert. The lines are color-coded to indicate whether the destination and 
source addresses are internal or external. Some alerts may be associated with two internal 
addresses or two external addresses , while others are involved in traffic between an inside host 
and an outside host. The technique used here is similar to that of parallel coordinates [Ins81], 
except instead of using parallel axes in two dimensions, we are using "parallel" planes in three 
dimensions. The planes in this visualization are not truly parallel , of course, but the idea of 
representing multi-dimensional data is similar. 
Alerts may toggled on or off by priority so that if, for example, there are many alerts of 
priority two on screen, we can disable them to see if they were covering any alerts of priority 
one. Additionally, the user may use the mouse to click on a cube, and the textual details of 
the corresponding alert will be printed to standard output. 
3.2.3 Trends 
Finally, the Trends visualization (figure 3.4) is an attempt to visualize both the packet 
aggregation information and the IDS alerts. The layout is a grid in the x-z plane whose 
dimensions represent time and port numbers. The port axis does not have a position for 
every port , but rather it is dynamically modified as the aggregated data is read in , such that 
a position is created for each port seen in the data . These positions on the axis are sorted 
from low to high and labeled in the visualization. At each point on the grid , then, if there 
exists data for that time period and port number , we draw a bar along the y-axis representing 
the associated amount of data. The measurement of data can be toggled between number of 
packets and number of bytes. 
Because we are giving much more space to each port in this visualization, compared to 
Island , we discovered that we needed to be careful about which ports we decided to put on 
the port axis. If an attacker runs a port scan , for example, we might have a thousand or more 
destination ports that have seen activity. If we include all these ports on the port axis the 
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display grows much too large . We addressed this by requiring each port to be seen a small 
number of times , either in distinct time periods or associated with different IP addresses, before 
it is included in the display. This way we exclude the activity from port scans, where each port 
on a single host is typically probed a small number of times during a short time span from a 
single source. Activity from a web server, however , would likely include numerous connections 
from a variety of sources over many time periods and would easily pass the threshold for 
inclusion. 
As the name implies, we also wanted to visualize longer-term trends in the network traffic 
along with the actual measured traffic for each time period. We accomplish this by first 
computing average values of traffic amounts as the aggregated packet data is read in. The 
average values computed for each time period are based on a predetermined length of time 
preceding that time period. For example, for this work, we configured the visualization to 
calculate the average amount of traffic per hour , based on the previous twelve hours of data. 
We then visually represent both the average value for a given time period, as well as the 
actual value. The average value is represented by a transparent red bar, and the actual value 
is represented by an opaque blue bar which has a slightly smaller footprint, thus fitting inside 
the footprint of the red bar. By rendering the opaque bar inside the transparent bar, we assist 
the user in comparing what is actually happening at that time period with the average for that 
time period based on recent history. For example, this may help a user see that a service which 
normally sees a constant, significant amount of traffic, like a web server, has suddenly dropped 
off to nothing, possibly indicating a compromised system, or simply a normal maintenance 
issue. 
In addition to aggregated packet data, we also represent alerts by drawing color-coded 
spheres above each location on the grid. The spheres are drawn in relation to the bars, so the 
bars will not occlude them. As in the other visualizations, here to the user can travel through 
the time dimension using keyboard input. 
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3.3 Implementation details 
This section provides a brief overview of the implementation details for the network data 
capture and reduction tool, as well as the visualizations. Readers uninterested in these details 
may skip to the next chapter. 
The network statistics capture tool was written in C++ and currently runs only in a Unix 
. environment. It utilizes the libpcap [Tcp05] library for capturing packet data from a local net-
work interface. By making use of this library and its built-in Berkely Packet Filter (BPF) filter 
string processing capabilities, we were able to easily provide the user with ability to selectively 
capture specific types of network traffic. While we considered implementing the capture and 
reduction tool in an interpreted language like Python [Pyt05) for rapid-development purposes, 
we decided on C++ because we wanted to avoid any performance issues associated with inter-
preted languages that might cause problems like dropping packets on a heavily-loaded network 
interface. 
The tool may read either archived network packet data in the form of tcpdump output 
files [Tcp05] or directly from a network interface. In the former case, the tool reads through 
the tcpdump file as quickly as possible, aggregating network statistics for each timeslice, and 
terminates when all data has been processed . In the latter case, the tool opens the default 
network interface, or a different interface if the user specifies one, and aggregates packet data in 
real time. In both the real time and archive input modes, as the tool completes the aggregation 
of statistics for each time period, it sends the aggregated data to any combination of output 
devices: 
• TCP socket connected to the visualization client 
• Binary file located in the local filesystem hierarchy 
• Standard output in textual form 
The socket output device is mainly intended for use when running the tool in real time 
mode. As packets are captured and analyzed, the data is sent to the visualization client which 
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can then update its display with the most recent data. The binary file mode may be used 
to archive the aggregated statistics. This is useful for capturing network data in real time 
and visualizing it later , and it is also beneficial for analyzing archived tcpdump data by only 
incurring the computation time of aggregation once. A separate, much simpler tool , written 
in Python, may be used to read the binary output file and send it over a TCP socket to the 
visualization client. Finally the textual standard output mode is mainly useful for debugging 
purposes, or to give the user feedback indicating when each period of aggregation has been 
completed. 
For a network IDS we used the popular open-source program Snort [Roe99]. Like our 
aggregation tool , Snort is capable of analyzing network traffic from either a tcpdump file or a 
live network interface. In both cases we used the default alert rules configuration. Alert output 
was written to Snort 's binary unified format which is supposed to have the lowest overhead of 
all output modes. While overhead did not turn out to be a problem issue in our research, since 
we used tcpdump files from a third party for evaluation purposes, this type of configuration 
will provide more robustness should the tools ever be used on a high-traffic interface. After 
producing the unified alert output we then use the Barnyard tool [Bar05] to process it and 
produce a comma separated values (CSV) text file where each line contains only the alert fields 
we are interested in: 
• Time of occurrence in seconds since the epoch 
• Event ID - unique integer identifier 
• Classname - text string describing the attack class 
• Priority - integer value from 1 to 5 indicating severity 
• Source IP address - dotted decimal notation string 
• Destination IP address - dotted decimal notation string 
• Destination UDP /TCP port 
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A date string is also prepended to each line of the CSV file to aid the user in browsing 
through the file manually, but this string is not used by the visualization client. The Barnyard 
tool is designed to either process a group of input files once and quit (batch mode) or run as 
a background process continually looking for new binary data from Snort (continuous mode). 
In the latter case Barnyard would append any alerts it finds to the end of the CSV file. We 
created another Python tool, very similar to the one described earlier, that reads this CSV file , 
converts the numeric values to binary formats to save space over their string representations, 
and sends the binary data over another TCP socket to the visualization client. Both of the 
Python tools that send data to the client periodically check their respective input files for 
updates until the user explicitly closes them. 
The visualization client itself is also written in Python. The OpenGL graphics programming 
library [Ope05], extended for use with Python as PyOpenGL [Pyo05], is used to render each 
of the visualizations. While it could be argued that we would achieve greater performance 
had we implemented the visualizations in a compiled language like C or C++, we felt that 
the complexity of our visualizations would not be so great as to tax our development system's 
resources , and the rapid application development benefits of using Python persuaded us to 
choose it for our effort. As Python is an object-oriented language, we used this to our advantage 
in developing a framework for the visualizations. A base class defines basic functionality like 
window resizing, camera translation and rotation, and mouse and keyboard input handling. 
The reading of data from the aggregation and alert tools is also implemented elsewhere as 
basic functionality. This essentially leaves the task of implementing each visualization idea on 
top of the base class, overriding pieces of its functionality if the defaults are not suitable. By 
separating the basic functionality of the visualization client from the implementation of each 
visualization, we made it relatively painless to rapidly prototype each of our visual concepts. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
First we discuss the sources of data used for evaluating the visualizations. Next we describe 
how well the data reduction techniques worked with respect to making the network statistics 
more manageable. Finally, we go over each of the visualizations again, this time describing the 
attacks that showed up particularly well in each of them. 
4.1 Evaluation data 
To evaluate the visualizations we used the 1999 data set from the well known DARPA 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation project at MIT 's Lincoln Laboratory [LHF+ 00]. 
The 1999 data set provided two weeks of test data in the form of tcpdump trace files, host 
audit data, and file system information. During these two weeks roughly 56 types of attacks 
were carried out in a total of 201 instances. The following description of classes of attacks from 
the 1999 data set is taken from the 1999 evaluation schedule at the project's website at MIT 
[ZisOl ]: 
• Denial of Service - Unauthorized attempt to disrupt the normal functioning of a victim 
host or network. 
• Remote to Local - Unauthorized obtaining of user privileges on a local host by a remote 
user without such privileges. 
• User to Root - Unauthorized access to local superuser or administrator privileges by a 
local unprivileged user. 
• Surveillance or Probe - Unauthorized probing of a machine or network to look for vul-
nerabilities, explore configurations, or map the network's topology. 
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• Data Compromise - Unauthorized access or modification of data on local host or remote 
host . 
Our visualizations focus on the network traffic only, ignoring the host-based audit and file 
sytsem data. Generally, the second class of attacks , User to Root, would not be detectable 
in the network traffic , as the related activities take place locally on a single· host. The other 
classes described are potentially detectable in the network traffic, and in particular the Denial 
of Service, Remote to Local, and Surveillance or Probe classes are very likely to make use of 
the network. Thus we focused on these three classes in evaluating our visualizations. 
In addition to aggregating information from the raw network data, we also processed the 
tcpdump files with Snort [Roe99] to generate the IDS alerts used in some of the visualizations. 
We used Snort's default rule configuration. 
4.2 Data reduction results 
The reduction of the amount of data achieved with our aggregation tool was significant. 
The 1999 data set contained roughly 8.6 GB of tcpdump data, and our tool initially reduced 
that to 24 MB of aggregated statistics. Using the superfluous SDP reduction option, that 
data is further reduced to 3.6 MB. It should be noted that while the original tcpdump data 
includes many types of traffic , our tool only aggregates statistics using TCP and UDP packets. 
Certainly a large majority of the data in the tcpdump files would consist of TCP or UDP traffic, 
however, as these are the transport layer protocols widely used for most network applications. 
4.3 Visualizations results 
In the following sections we describe the results for each of the visualizations. We discuss the 
specific attacks that are visible and how they are manifested in the particular visualization. For 
the visualizations that make use of aggregated network statistics, we used the data produced 
by our aggregation tool with the superfluous SDP reduction option enabled. Note that specific 
information describing the attacks in the 1999 Lincoln Labs data sets is taken from Kris 
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Kendall 's MIT Master 's thesis [Ken98]. All times are given in 24-hour format for the United 
States Eastern timezone, which is the timezone in which the data set was originally created. 
4.3.1 Island 
One attack that produces some noticeable visual clues in this visualization is httptunnel. 
This attack involves a multistep process where the attacker must first gain access to a target 
machine and install an http client program. The client is set up to periodically connect to a 
predetermined http server which is controlled by the attacker. After the client is set up, possibly 
using the system's scheduling facilities to run it at a certain time each day, the attacker can 
log off of the target machine. Each time the client connects to the attacker's http server, the 
server may send a cookie to the client with instructions embedded in it for the client to carry 
out. For example, the cookie may tell the client to send the contents of the password file back 
to the server. 
While the first step in the attack of installing the http client is not visible, the second and 
more interesting step occurs during the second week of the test data and is captured in the 
series of screenshots in figure 4.1. The client is actually installed at 9:00 on March 30th, and 
the first automatic connection by the client to the attacker's http server occurs shortly after 
12:00. It is this second type of activity that is visible in the Island visualization. Leading 
up to this time period the middle of the island , representing port numbers greater than 1024, 
is fairly empty. A few lone trees appear in the middle area from time to time, representing, 
for example, the client end of an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) connection. Since IRC daemons 
typically use port 6667, which is greater than 1024, the data reduction technique described in 
the previous chapter does not aggregate the statistics of traffic leaving the IRC server in with 
the statistics of traffic destined for the server. Thus, a few spurious trees appearing in the 
middle of the island are not necessarily cause for alarm. 
What should draw the attention of the viewer , however, is the row of trees that appears 
just after 12:05 on March 30th. Representing packets with destination port numbers 32991 , 
32992, 32993, 32994, 32998, 32999, 33000, 33001 , 33002, 33004, this row of trees seems out 
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of place compared to the activity on the island during the previous day. Moving through the 
time periods before and after this occurrence the user would notice that these ports are only 
in use during this one five minute period the entire day. If these ports were associated with 
some typical resource usage, one would assume they would appear multiple times in a day, or 
at least in similar patterns. While viewing the traffic for the following day, the user would 
likely notice that in fact a similar pattern does occur, in a different location. Again, just after 
12:05, on March 31st, a row of trees appears briefly, representing a similar, but not identical, 
set of ports (32928, 32929, 32930, 32931, 32932, 32933, 32935, 32936, 32937, 32938). 
We provided a keyboard shortcut in this visualization to skip exactly 24 hours forward or 
backward from the current moment on display, and making use of this one can quickly see that 
this pattern of trees appears a total of four times during the first week of test data, at the exact 
same time range on each of March 30th, 31st, April 1st, and April 2nd. If the user continues to 
check this time period in the second week of test data, they will see that the patterns appear 
again every weekday, April 5th through April 9th. What makes the appearances in the second 
week more interesting than those in the first week is the fact that on two of the days, April 
6th and April 8th, fruit are drawn above one of the trees in the group, indicating that some 
amount of data transfer occurred. During the first week no fruit are drawn, meaning that 
while connection attempts were made, none of the network packets had any payload. 
The other features of the trees indicate that in each case it is likely that the same source 
and destination IP addresses are involved. The leaves at the top of each tree in these groups 
appear to have the same tone of color, the same angle of rotation about the tree trunk, and 
the same length. Thus the source IP address is very likely the same. Similarly, the branches 
all appear to have the same angle of rotation about the tree trunk, the same height from 
the ground, and the twigs appear to be at the same distance on the branch and in the same 
orientation as well. Thus the destination IP address is also very likely the same. 
There is the possibility that two source or destination addresses might differ by one in the 
most significant octet, for example 1.2.3.4 and 2.2.3.4. In this case the addresses most likely 
belong to completely different networks, but they would appear very similar as presented in 
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the visualization. The exact addresses would be uncovered , however , when the user decides 
to investigate further through whatever means are available. This could include future imple-
mentation work in this visualization to provide drill-down features for getting at the data, or 
utilization of an external network logging facility. 
Regarding the discovery of the httptunnel attack based on the activity in the visualiza-
tion , the precise periodical nature of the group of trees during four days in week one and five 
days in week two would suggest something like a scheduled or long-running process. Since the 
destination port numbers vary from day to day, one might assume these are dynamically allo-
cated source ports used by the mystery program to connect to some service on the destination 
host. At this point a curious or concerned security administrator could check the local host 
in question and try to find some trace of the program by looking at the scheduling system 
configuration or the list of running processes. If the ports continue to show up each day, it 
would be relatively simple to temporarily log which processes on that host are making network 
connections during that time period. 
A second attack that is easily noticed in the Island visualization , though not easily identi-
fied , is the SYN flood Denial of Service attack , carried out by the neptune tool in this case. It is 
difficult to precisely identify because its visual signature in the Island visualization could easily 
be mistaken for a large-scale port scanning Probe attack , such as might be done with a tool like 
Nmap (Nma05]. Both attacks potentially try to make connections to a large, contiguous range 
of ports on a host , but their aims are different. Whereas a port scanning Probe is typically 
done with the intent to gather information , e.g., which ports are listening for connections , the 
SYN flood attack is designed to interrupt the network services a system is providing, or even 
bring the entire system down. It does this by sending a large number of TCP SYN packets to a 
multitude of ports on the target (thus the name SYN flood) without completing the three-way 
TCP handshake or closing the connection. Each of these connections consumes some part 
of a finite size data structure, and while there is typically a timeout period after which such 
connections are automatically closed and resources are reclaimed , the attack can be successful 
if the adversary creates the connections faster than the operating system closes them. 
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In the testing portion of the 1999 Lincoln Labs data set , the SYN flood attack t akes place 
on four occasions. The beginning of one of these is visible in fi gure 4.2. The circular pattern of 
similar looking trees is an obvious indicator that a range of sequential ports are seeing activity 
within a short timespan. Determining from the visualization alone what kind of attack is 
taking place is difficult , however , and a security administrator would need to consult other 
sources of information, such as related IDS alerts or the state of the targeted system, to get a 
better idea of whether this is a Probe, a Denial of Service, or something else. 
4.3.2 Alert Plot 
A number of attacks in the 1999 Lincoln Labs data set are visible in the Alert Plot visual-
ization due to a sort of clumping behavior. One such example is that of the portsweep Probe 
attack. While this attack is not described in Kendall 's thesis, it is fairly trivial; a program on 
one host scans some set of ports on the target host in an attempt to determine what services 
are listening for incoming connections. The intent may be to find for vulnerable services which 
could then be exploited by the attacker. There are fifteen instances of portsweep in the two 
weeks of the 1999 test data set, and thirteen of those probes check only ten or fewer ports. 
While a more thorough scan containing hundreds or thousands of ports may be easily noticed 
by a security administrator reading through textual IDS logs, it would be easier to pass over 
five to ten lines of a smaller-scale scan as described above. 
The visualization screenshot in figure 4.3 shows a couple of features that make the small-
scale portsweep stand out. First of all , this particular scan took a little under five minutes to 
complete, and it was targeted at a small number of privileged ports relatively close to each 
other ( 21 , 23 , 25 , 79, 143). Accordingly, the five alerts corresponding to the scanning of each 
of these ports are represented in the visualization in close proximity to one another , as the 
vertical axis represents port numbers and the horizontal axis represents time. In addition to 
location, the lines drawn to the local and external IP address grids also draw attention to this 
cluster of alerts. It is somewhat clearer following the lines from the alerts towards the upper 
right grid to see that they appear to converge to a single point on the grid. As the lines are 
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colored red , meaning the alerts had external source addresses and local destination addresses, 
the traffic associated with the cluster of alerts originated , at the very least , from hosts with 
identical first and second IP address octets. Following the red lines from the alerts to the 
upper left grid of local IP addresses also gives the appearance of convergence, though a bit 
less clearly because of the surrounding mass of lines. Further inspection of the clustered alerts 
using mouse interaction to see the textual alert details reveals that the related network activity 
is in fact originating from a single external host and directed at single internal host. The alert 
text also indicates that the activity is a scan. 
Another attack that shows up in this visualization, in a manner similar to the portsweep, 
is the dictionary attack (Figure 4.4). This is a Remote to Local attack in which the adversary 
tries to guess a user's password on a particular host by repeatedly making connections to user 
services like telnet and ftp, guessing different passwords each time. The particular dictionary 
attack that occurs at 16:32 on April 5th, 1999 produces over 80 telnet connections during a 
period of roughly 16 minutes. The associated alerts produced by Snort are clustered together 
because of the short time span and the destination port numbers falling close together. In this 
case, however, it is interesting that the destination port numbers appear to be the dynamically 
allocated source ports on the connecting host of the attacker, rather than port 23 on the telnet 
server. This is because Snort detects the failed password guesses in the pay load of the telnet 
packets headed back to the attacker, typically containing a message like Login failed. Since 
the attacker keeps making connections, the allocated source port on his or her machine is 
continually being incremented. 
This attack is quite hard to miss in the visualization as it passes through the right-most 
segment of the alerts grid. The lines drawn from alerts to IP addresses form dense fan shapes 
which stand out against the other less frequent alerts and associated lines. Additionally, this 
attack should cause the administrator further concern due to the fact that the related network 
traffic is both destined for and originating from the local network. This is a strong indicator 
that either a trusted employee is trying to break into a system they are not authorized to access, 
or else an attacker has already broken into one local system and is using it as a stepping stone 
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to attempt to break into another. 
4.3.3 Trends 
The main attack we noticed using the Trends visualization was the udpstorm Denial of 
Service attack. This attack occurs twice during the testing period, first on April 5th, 1999 at 
20:00:07, and second on April 7th, 1999 at 05:30:38. A udpstorm attack causes a large amount 
of network traffic with the intent of causing congestion and slowing the network down. The 
basic idea is to link two UDP services on two hosts such that they each cause the other to 
produce output in a continuous fashion. In the two instances in the Lincoln Labs data set, a 
spoofed UDP packet forged to look like it originated from the echo port (port 7) of one internal 
host is sent to the echo port on another host on the same network. Because the echo service 
simply replies to any data it receives with a copy of that data, the effect is a sudden burst of 
network activity between the affected hosts. The activity does not cease until the echo service 
on host is restarted. 
This burst of network activity shows up quite clearly in the Trends visualization (Figure 
4.5). As seen in the screenshot , the activity on the echo port is relatively low or nonexistent 
until the time period of the first attack. The visualization was configured to display the average 
network activity per hour based on the accumulated activity from the previous twelve hours. 
Recall that the time label for each column indicates that the bars in that column represent 
activity that occurred over the previous hour of time. Thus, the network activity of the first 
udpstorm attack, which occurred during the 20th hour of that day, shows up in the column 
labeled Mon Apr 5 21: 00: 00 1999. The height of the bar indicates that over one million 
bytes were seen in that hour, and with knowledge of the echo service 's intended function as a 
debugging tool, this activity should draw the user 's attention. 
4.4 Insights 
As we developed and evaluated these visualizations, we gained a number of insights regard-
ing our successes and failures, the kinds of attacks that can be visualized, and the advantages 
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of using of three-dimensional graphics. 
One insight relates to the three-dimensional nature of our visualizations. While it may be 
obvious, we feel that it warrants explicit mention as we have not seen much research using 
similar techniques. The insight is that, by implementing each of our visual concepts in true 
3D space, we gained a built-in drill-down of sorts from the basic camera transformations we 
implemented: zoom, rotation, and pan. For each of our three concepts, this ability proved quite 
valuable. In the Island and Trends visuals, orbiting the camera about the central elements 
was key to finding the best perspective to investigate a particular time period or portion of 
the display. Because we visualized data in three-dimensional space, some graphical elements 
would occlude others, especially in the Trends visual, and camera manipulation was necessary 
to fully investigate many scenes. Zooming and panning were also useful. In the Island visual 
one can get a feel for which ports are being used with the camera at a distance such that the 
entire island is in view; after noticing suspicous port activity, the user is able to move the 
camera in close to the particular tree and look at the leaves and branches to get an idea of the 
source and destination IP addresses involved. In the Alert Plot visualization, the panning and 
zooming functionality aids the user in examining clusters of alerts up close, as well as making 
it easier to more precisely select individual alerts to get their textual description on standard 
output. Admittedly, the camera transformations may add to the learning curve of using the 
visualizations, especially for those who are used to more static displays , but we believe the 
benefits of full three-dimensional exploration make the extra effort worth it. 
From our initial experience with these visualizations, there appear to be two visual char-
acteristics that cause an attack to stand out: it either generates a noticeable pattern or it 
does not fit in with the surrounding data or the user 's expectations. Portscans and Denial 
of Service attacks like SYN flood typically create visual patterns as they either access many 
sequential ports or, in some cases, access fewer ports that are clustered together. Udpstorm 
was noticeable in the Trends visualization because for a few time periods, the amount of traffic 
shown on port 7 was comparable to the level of traffic seen on port 80. If the user realizes that 
port 7, the echo port , is intended mainly for debugging purposes , this level of traffic seems 
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quite out of place. 
Password guessing also appears as an interesting pattern. Each failed password guess is 
detected by Snort in the packets sent back to the attacker, and the destination port in the alert 
is actually the source port from which the telnet connection was made. So as source ports are 
incremented for successive telnet connections, we see the associated alerts in Alert Plot as an 
upward-sloping group of cubes. Even if we plotted the alert by the service port, 23, we would 
still see a group of alerts plotted horizontally. 
More difficult to detect in a visualization is an attack that requires only a few small transfers 
of data. Many buffer-overflow exploits would fall into this category, and the attacks that hit 
services which normally see high amounts of traffic would be particularly difficult to notice. 
While the httptunnel backdoor-type attack is not an exploit, it does show up despite the 
relatively little amount of data involved. It is noticeable because, for whatever reason, the 
installed http client tries 11 connections in rapid succession to port 8000 on an external host, 
which causes 11 nearly consecutive source ports to be used on the client side. Since 8000 falls 
above the threshold for SDP reduction in our aggregation tool , each of the source ports is 
recorded in a distinct SDP when the server sends its responses back to the client, and they are 
thus displayed as a cluster in the Island visualization. Add to this the fact that the clusters of 
ports appear nine out of ten days during the exact same time period, and this traffic stands 
out as being suspicious. 
Finally, when moving through the time domain in a visual like Island, where one time 
period scene replaces the previous, one sees some port activity flash on and off in brief spurts. 
By watching the visual as a whole, one can in some cases match up source and destination 
ports by noticing which ports seem to be synchronized. This was noticeable with 6667, the ire 
service port, and the high source ports of a few clients making connections. One would also be 
able to notice, if paying close attention, that port 8000 seemed to see traffic at the same time 
as the range of source ports involved in the httptunnel attack. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
The goal of this thesis was to explore the area of three-dimensional visualization as applied 
to intrusion detection, through the use of IDS alerts and aggregated network statistics . While 
there has been a fair amount of recent research aimed at using visualization for intrusion 
detection purposes, much of it has focused on two-dimensional models . We wanted to test the 
three-dimensional waters and get a sense of the potential such models hold. 
In our work we came up with three initial concepts for visualizations. The Island concept 
took the iconic form of a small piece of land surrounded by water. On this land trees are used 
to represent aggregated network statistics. The position of a tree indicates the destination 
port, the leaves portray the number and variety of source IP addresses using that port, the 
branches portray the number and variety of associated destination IP addresses, and a piece 
of fruit shows the amount of activity for each time period. 
The second visualization was the Alert Plot concept, which focused on alerts generated 
by a signature or knowledge-based intrusion detection system. The alerts are plotted in a 2D 
grid based on time and destination port, and the third dimension is used to provide additional 
context in the form of local and external source and destination IP addresses. 
Finally, we had the Trends visualization, in which we worked primarily with aggregated 
network statistics, though we also made use of the alert data. Here we considered only ports 
that had seen more than a predefined minimum threshold of activity. Our intent was to focus 
on significant levels of activity and ignore probes like portsweep. By calculating average traffic 
statistics over large periods of time, we gave the user a way to compare the amount of actual 
traffic per port at any given time with the average amount based on recent history. 
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We utilized the 1999 Lincoln Labs network data set , specifically the two weeks of testing 
data, to evaluate the visualization concepts. While the data set is certainly not representative 
of all or even most networks in use today, it did provide a starting step for our research in 
a culture where privacy concerns make it difficult to obtain legitimate data. The variety and 
frequency of attacks in the data set were useful in developing an initial impression of the types 
of attacks that are easily visualized in three dimensions, as well as those that are more difficult. 
Given the results of evaluating our visualizations with this data set, we feel there is promise in 
three-dimensional concepts. More work needs to be done, but ultimately they could provide 
the security administrator with a very rich environment in which to sort out the many events 
on their networks. 
5.2 Future Work 
One obvious area for future work is that of drill-down and interaction techniques. Rendering 
our visualizations as polygonal models in true three-dimensional space provided a simple sort of 
built-in drill-down ability. Using the camera functionality one can start at a zoomed-out view, 
look for points of interest, and then close in on each hotspot one at a time, zooming, rotating, 
and translating to get many different perspectives. There is some utility in having this ability, 
especially in a visualization like Island where we rendered some data as relatively small features 
on each tree. More useful, however, would be functionality such as automatically rendering 
more detailed textual information as the camera closes in on a few individual elements of the 
visualization, or responding to user input on the mouse or keyboard by switching to a different, 
related visualization that provides finer-grained detail of an element from the previous scene. 
We started exploring three-dimensional visualization to see what kinds of patterns show up 
that would attract the user's attention, and there is plenty of room for work in what to do 
after the attention has been obtained. 
Another area of work involves figuring out what features, when visualized, would help reveal 
the difficult-to-detect attacks. These are the ones that need little time or data to succeed, such 
as buffer overflow exploits. One way to think about such attacks may be to visually characterize 
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the payload content of each packet. If one could generate some kind of visual signature based 
on the payload in a manner that makes legitimate traffic on a port look homogenous in some 
way, then the payload associated with a buffer overflow attack might be different enough to 
create a noticeable visual anomaly. The downside to this is that more processing time would 
be needed to capture and analyze the full payload of each packet. 
With regard to data storage, another useful area for future work would be determining 
how to best store collected data to be visualized. We used the network traffic aggregation tool 
to reduce large amounts of raw network traffic to more manageable pieces of information, but 
we did not consider how to best store the reduced information, especially for use in an actual 
deployment where network information and IDS alerts would be produced on a continual basis. 
A major challenge with respect to interactive visualization is making the data available to the 
visualization program in a timely manner so as to avoid affecting its responsiveness. With 
larger amounts of data we cannot simply read it all at once from disk into main memory. 
Finally, the creative area of developing visualization concepts always has room for new 
ideas. We barely scratched the surface with the three concepts developed in this work, but 
we hope they will serve as some kind of inspiration, or a potential starting point, for others. 
Just as the minds of the most skilled attackers are both sharp and creative, so too must be 
the minds of those working to provide a balance through tools and techniques. 
[Axe99) 
[Bar05) 
[BFN04) 
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